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Advances in the Economics of Competition Law
Short biographies
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Mark Armstrong
Mark
Armstrong is professor of Economics at the Department
of Economics of the University College London. He is
co-editor of the Handbook
of Industrial Organization
and member of the Editorial Board of the Review of Economic
Studies, the Journal of Industrial Economics and the
RAND Journal of Economics. Professors Armstrong articles
include: “Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by
a Regulated Monopolist”, RAND
Journal of Economics;
“Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing”, Econometrica;
“Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm",
Review
of Economic Studies;
and “Competitive Price Discrimination”, RAND
Journal of Economics.
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Jonathan B. Baker
Jonathan Baker is professor of law at the Washington
College of Law of the American University. He
has been Director of the Bureau of Economics at the
Federal Trade Commission from 1995 through 1998 and,
before that, Senior Economist in the Council of Economic
Advisers, Executive Office of the President of the United
States. Baker has widely published in the fields of
antitrust law and industrial organization economics.
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Timothy F. Bresnahan
Timothy Bresnahan is Landau Professor in Technology
and the Economy at Stanford University. From 1999 to
2000 he has been Deputy Assistant Attorney General and
Chief Economist at the U.S. DoJ Antitrust Division.
His current research interests include competition in
high technology industries. Bresnahan has published
more than sixty professional articles in scholarly journals,
including the American Economic Review, the Rand Journal
of Economics and many others. He is fellow of the Econometric
Society and of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Paolo Buccirossi
Paolo
Buccirossi is Director of Lear – Laboratorio di economia,
antitrust, regolamentazione. He
has worked for several years at the Autorità
garante della concorrenza e del
mercato (Italian Competition Authority). From January
1995 to October 1998 he served as an economist in two
Investigation Units. In 1998 he joined the Directorate
of Law and Economic Studies of the Italian Competition
Authority where he was responsible for reviewing the
economic analysis of all the cases before the Authority.
He also represented Italy
in several international meetings held at OECD (Competition
Law and Policy Committee) and at the European Commission
(Advisory Committee and Hearings). Paolo Buccirossi
regularly teaches Antitrust Economics at undergraduate
and graduate courses held in several universities in
Italy
such as LUISS, University
of
Rome
Tor
Vergata and University
of Padua.
He has published in several scholarly journals including
the Journal
of Industrial Economics
and the Journal
of Regulatory Economics.
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Carlo Cambini
Carlo Cambini is Professor of Economics at the Politecnico
of Turin and Special Consultant of Lear. He is an expert
of Antitrust and Regulation Economics, and specializes
on telecommunications and network industries. Carlo
Cambini has advised several companies and public bodies
in the electronic communications sector. He has published
on leading international economic journals, including
the RAND
Journal of Economics.
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Nicholas Economides
Nicholas
Economides is Professor of Economics at the Stern School
of Business of the New
York University.
He is Director of Networks, Electronic Commerce and
Telecommunications ("NET") Institute. Economides
has been advisor to major telecommunications corporations,
a number of the Federal Reserve Banks, the Bank of Greece,
and major Financial Exchanges. He has published extensively
on leading scholarly journals including the American
Economic Review,
The
Journal of Economic Theory,
and the RAND
Journal of Economics.
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Richard J. Gilbert
Richard Gilbert is
Professor of Economics at the University of California
at Berkeley.
From 1993 to 1995 he was the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for Economics in the Antitrust Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice, where he led a task
force that developed joint Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property.
Before serving in the Department of Justice,
he was the Director of the University
of California
Energy
Institute and Associate Editor of The
Journal of Industrial Economics, The Journal of Economic
Theory, and
The Review of Industrial Organization. From 1993 until
1994 he was president of The Industrial Organization
Society. Professor
Gilbert's research specialties are in the areas of antitrust
economics, intellectual property, research and development,
energy markets, and public utility regulation.
Professor
Gilbert received Bachelor and Master of Science degrees
from Cornell University, and Master of Arts and Doctor
of Philosophy degrees from Stanford University. |
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Joseph E. Harrington
Jr.
Joseph
E. Harrington, Jr. is Professor of Economics at Johns
Hopkins University. His fields of inquiry are industrial
organization and organization theory and involve the
use of both analytical and computational methods. He
has published in leading journals including the American
Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political
Economy, Management Science, and RAND Journal of Economics.
He is best well-known for his work on collusion which
has investigated the impact on collusive pricing of
cyclical demand, entry, imperfect monitoring, and multi-market
interaction. His current research agenda is to develop
a theory of cartel pricing when colluding firms are
trying to elude detection by buyers and antitrust authorities.
His research on organizations has focused on the role
of organizational structure and is reviewed (along with
other work) in "Agent-Based Models of Organizations,"
(co-authored with Myong-Hun Chang) which is forthcoming
in the second volume of the Handbook of Computational
Economics. Professor Harrington is currently a co-editor
at the RAND Journal of Economics and is formerly an
editor at the International Journal of Industrial Organization
and a co-editor at the Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy. He has given short courses at the Norwegian
School of Economics, the Summer School in Regulation
and Antitrust at the New University of Lisbon, and ENCORE
at the University of Amsterdam. Along with John Vernon
and Kip Viscusi, he is a co-author of Economics of Regulation
and Antitrust; the fourth edition of which is due out
in 2005 from MIT Press.
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Paul Klemperer
Paul
Klemperer is a Member of the U.K. Competition
Commission, and has advised the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
the European Commission, and several other government
agencies and private companies; he was the principal
auction theorist advising the U.K. government on its
"3G" mobile-phone license auction that raised
$34 billion. He is Edgeworth Professor of Economics
at Oxford University, a Fellow of the British Academy
and of the Econometric Society, and Member of the Executive
Committee, and Council, of the Royal Economic Society,
he is also a Member of Council of the European Economic
Association, and the Econometric Society. He gained
a BA in Engineering at Cambridge University, and an
MBA and a PhD in Economics at Stanford University. He
is a world-renowned expert in industrial organization
and auctions; he is past or present Editor or Associate
Editor of 12 economics journals, and has authored numerous
publications including, most recently, Auctions: Theory
and Practice (Princeton, 2004).
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Kai-Uwe Kuhn
Prior
to joining the faculty at Michigan
in
1998, Professor Kühn taught at the Institut d'
Analisi Economica (CSIC) in Barcelona. His
main research interests are in industrial organization
and competition policy. He is a research fellow of the
Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London. Among
his papers: "Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication
Between Firms," Economic Policy: A European Forum;
"Excess Entry, Vertical Integration, and Welfare,"
RAND
Journal of Economics,
(with Xavier Vives); "Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically
Related Duopolies," RAND
Journal of Economics,
28(1), Spring 1997, 37-62.
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Francine Lafontaine
Francine
Lafontaine is Professor of Business Economics and Public
Policy at the University of Michigan Business School
and a Professor of Economics at the University
of
Michigan’s
Department of Economics. Lafontaine's areas of interest
include Industrial Organization, Vertical Relationships,
Contracting and Franchising. She has studied extensively
and continues to work on the economics of franchise
contracting, applying recent advances in contract theory
and vertical relationships to the analysis of franchising
contracts. She has become a leading expert in that area.
Among Lafontaine’s publications: "Retail Contracting:
Theory and Practice" (with Margaret Slade), Journal
of Industrial Economics;
"Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising"
(with Kathryn L. Shaw), RAND
Journal of Economics.
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Damien Neven
Damein
Neven is professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute
of International Studies, University
of
Geneva.
His current research deals with the co-ordination of
Antitrust policies across jurisdictions, the political
economy of merger control and the antitrust analysis
of sports competitions. He is also a member of the Academic
Advisory Committee to the Competition Directorate of
the European Commission. Among his publications: “Competition
and rent sharing in the airlines industry” (with L.-H.
Röller), European
Economic Review,
and “Regulatory Reform in the European Community”, American
Economic Review.
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Janusz A. Ordover
Janusz
Ordover is professor of Economics at the Department
of Economics of the New
York University.
From 1991 to 1992 he has served as Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for Economics at the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice. Ordover is member of the
Board of Editors of the Antitrust Report, and the American
Bar Association. He has acted as consultant of the World
Bank, OECD and other institutions including the Polish
Ministry of Finance and the Working Group on Bulgaria’s
Draft Antitrust Law. Among his publications: “Entry
Analysis Under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines”,
Antitrust
Law Journal
(with Jonathan B. Baker); “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure”,
American
Economic Review
(with G. Saloner and S.
Salop);
"Predation,
Monopolization, and Antitrust," (with G. Saloner)
in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook
of Industrial Organization,
North
Holland.
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Patrick Rey
Patrick
Rey is Professor of Economics at the University Toulouse
and Research Director of IDEI-
Institut
d’Economie Industrielle. Fellow of the Econometric Society,
he has been member of the Editorial Board of the Review
of Economic Studies and currently is in the Editorial
Board of the Journal of Public Economics. Rey has served
as consultant for the World Bank (on Competition Policy
and Economic Development), OECD (Report on Franchising),
and the European Commission (Report for DG II on Competition
policy towards vertical Restraints, Member of DG IV’s
Scientific Advisory Committee). Patrick Rey is one of
the authors of Competition
policy and Vertical Restraints: Franchising Agreements,
1994, OECD, Paris.
His publications include: "The Logic of Vertical
Restraints", (with J. Tirole), American
Economic Review,
"Long-Term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the
value of Commitment in Contracting", (with B. Salanié),
Econometrica,
"Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion",
(with O. Compte and F. Jenny), European
Economic Review.
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Michael Riordan
Michael
Riordan is Laurans A. and Arlene Mendelson Professor
of Economics and Business, at the Columbia University. He is
fellow of the Econometric Society and in 2002 received
the Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Award for Antitrust Scholarship.
He has acted as Co-Editor of the RAND Journal of Economics
and is in the Board of Editors of the American Economic
Review. Riordan has published in leading economic journals
such as Econometrica, American Economic Review, Review
of Economic Studies, The Journal of Economic Theory
and the RAND Journal of Economics.
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Jean-Charles
Rochet
Jean-Charles Rochet is a former
student of Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris) and
holds Ph.D.in Mathematical Economics from Paris – Dauphine
University . His dissertation won the Arconati-Visconti
award. He has taught in Paris, France (ENSAE and Ecole
Polytechnique) and London, U.K. ( B.P. visiting professor,
London School of Economics, 2001-02). He is a Fellow
of the Econometric Society since 1995. He has also been
council member of European Economic Association,
and associate editor of Econometrica . He is currently
Professor of Economics at Toulouse University
and Research Director at Institut D’Economie Industrielle.
He has written more than 50 articles in international
scientific journals (Econometrica, Review of Economic
Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Rand Journal of
Economics,…) and 3 textbooks , including
Microeconomics of Banking (with X. FREIXAS) MIT Press
(1997). His research interests include platform competition,
nonlinear pricing, theory of contracts, banking crises,
and solvency regulations for financial institutions.
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Lars-Hendrik Röller
Lars-Hendrik
Röller is the Chief Economist of the Directorate
General for Competition of the European Commission.
He holds the Chair of Industrial Economics at Humboldt
University
in
Berlin.
He is a fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR) in London
and
is the co-director of CEPR's program in Industrial Organization.
He is on the editorial board of the Journal of Industrial
Economics, editor of the International Journal of Industrial
Organization and member of the Executive Board of the
European Association for Research in Industrial Economics
(EARIE). Professor Röller's research interests
are in the area of empirical industrial organization.
He developed structural econometric models of market
and cost characteristics deriving their implications
for policy and strategy. His articles have appeared
in the American Economic Review, European Economic Review,
RAND Journal of Economics, Economic Policy, Economic
Journal, the Journal of Industrial Economics, and the
International Journal of Industrial Organization.
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Margaret Slade
Margaret
Slade is Leverhulme Professor of Industry and Organization
at the Department of Economics of the University of
Warwick (UK). She is an associate editor the International
Journal of Industrial Organization and previously held
the same position in the Journal of Industrial Economics
and the Canadian Journal of Economics. Margaret Slade
has served as consultant for several institutions including
the Federal Trade Commission in the US,
the Canadian Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
and the Bureau of Competition Policy of Canada. Among
her publications: “Mergers, Brand Competition, and the
Price of a Pint,” (with Joris Pinkse) European
Economic Review;
“Market Power and Joint Dominance in UK Brewing,"
Journal
of Industrial Economics,
"Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice"
(with Francine Lafontaine) Journal
of Industrial Economics;
Spatial Price Competition: a Semiparametric Approach,
(with Joris Pinkse and Craig Brett) Econometrica.
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Giancarlo Spagnolo
Giancarlo Spagnolo
is Head of Research at Consip SpA and Visiting Associate
Professor of Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics.
He is also in the Executive Committee of the European
Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and a Research Affiliate
of the CEPR. His research focuses on applied microeconomics
in general, including game and contract theory, industrial
organization, competition policy, corporate finance
and procurement, and was published on leading international
journals such as the RAND Journal of Economics, the Journal and Economic Theory and the European Economic
Review.
He earned an MPhil from the University of Cambridge and a PhD in Economics
from the Stockholm School of Economics.
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Jean Tirole
Jean Tirole is scientific director of the Institut
d'Economie Industrielle, University of Social Sciences,
Toulouse. He is also affiliated with CERAS, Paris and
MIT, where he holds a visiting position. Before moving
to Toulouse in 1991, he was professor of economics at
MIT. In 1998, he was president of the Econometric Society,
whose executive committee he had served on since 1993.
He was president of the European Economic Association
in 2001. Jean Tirole received a Doctorate Honoris Causa
from the Free University in Brussels in 1989,
the Yrjö Jahnsson prize of the European Economic
Association in 1993, and the Public Utility Research
Center Distinguished Service Award (University of Florida)
in 1997. He is a foreign honorary member of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1993) and of
the American Economic Association (1993). He has also
been a Sloan Fellow (1985) and a Guggenheim
Fellow (1988). He has given several invited lectures,
including the Hicks lecture (Oxford 1992), the Walras-Pareto
lectures (Lausanne 1992), the Schumpeter lecture (European
Economic Association 1993), the Pazner lecture (Tel
Aviv 1993), the Walras-Bowley lecture (Econometric Society
1994), the Munich lectures (Munich 1996),the JMCB lecture(1999),
the Wicksell lectures(1999), the Baffi lectures (Bank
of Italy , 2000) , the Scribner lectures and the
Frank Graham lecture at Princeton (2002), the Marshall
lectures (Cambridge 2003), and the Tinbergen lecture
(Amsterdam 2003). Jean Tirole has published over a hundred
thirty professional articles in economics and finance,
as well as 8 books including The Theory of Industrial
Organization, Game Theory (with Drew Fudenberg), A Theory
of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques
Laffont) , The Prudential Regulation of Banks
(with Mathias Dewatripont), Competition in Telecommunications
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont) and Financial Crises, Liquidity,
and the International Monetary System .He is currently
working on The Theory of Corporate Finance and on Egonomics
(with Roland Benabou). His research covers industrial
organization, regulation, game theory, banking and finance,
psychology and economics, international finance and
macroeconomics. He received his PhD in economics from
MIT in 1981, engineering degrees from Ecole Polytechnique,
Paris (1976) and from Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées,
Paris (1978) and a "Doctorat de 3ème cycle''
in decision mathematics from the University Paris IX
(1978).
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Thibaud Vergé
Thibaud Vergé is Lecturer at the University
of Southampton and Associate Member of the Leverhulme
Centre for Market and PublicOrganisation, University
of Bristol. His research interests include industrial
organization and competition policy.
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Gregory J. Werden
Gregory J. Werden is Senior Economic Counsel in the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
where he has worked since 1977. He earned several
degrees including a Ph.D. in economics from the University
of Wisconsin. He was a principal author of the
1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines, as well as four other
sets of antitrust enforcement guidelines. He assisted
in the preparation of over forty amicus briefs filed
with the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, and
worked on all appeals of the Department of Justice civil
antitrust cases since 1985. He has published extensively
on antitrust policy, with particular focus on market
delineation and merger simulation.
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Robert D. Willig
A
former supervisor of economic research at Bell Laboratories,
professor Willig is the coauthor of Welfare
Analysis of Policies Affecting Prices and Products,
and Contestable
Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure,
and coeditor of The
Handbook of Industrial Organization
and Can
Privatization Deliver?: Infrastructure for Latin America.
A fellow of the Econometric Society, he has served on
the editorial boards of the American Economic Review
and the Journal of Industrial Economics. He served in
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
as deputy assistant attorney general for economics,
1989–1991, and has been a member of policy task forces
under the aegis of the Governor of New Jersey, the Defense
Science Board, and the National Research Council. He
works with the Inter-American Development Bank and the
World Bank on issues of infrastructure privatization
and competition policy. He has written numerous articles
including “Consumer’s Surplus without Apology,” “Free
Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly,” and
“Merger Analysis, IO Theory, and Merger Guidelines.” |
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